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Abstract 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was created in 1967 in response to the 
growing threat of nuclear weapon detonation.1 Today, it has been signed and ratified by 
190 countries who pledge to pursue efforts towards non-proliferation, peaceful nuclear 
energy, and nuclear disarmament. Five states remain outside of the treaty, four of which 
are nuclear weapon states: Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea. The nuclear weapon 
states in the NPT have been established as Britain, France, the U.S., Russia, and China.  
The NPT has been created and maintained through the existence of power 
dynamics between nuclear and non-nuclear states. The potential to use nuclear weapons 
in warfare, a fearful conception that induced this treaty, has since become unrealistic.2 
Yet nuclear weapons continue to remain a source of political and diplomatic power for 
the five nuclear weapon states whose authority has been validated through the treaty. The 
perception of nuclear weapons as a manifestation of state power has enabled their 
persistence in a world of evolving approaches to conflict that render their use as an 
offensive and defensive strategy to be superseded by advanced forms of warfare.  
This paper looks at the NPT in the context of the evolving global security 
dynamic, and analyzes how the importance of nuclear weapons has shifted from a 
defense strategy to a powerful symbol of political authority. Reports and publications 
from the ICRC and the Geneva Call support arguments of recent developments and 
challenges in defending against modern forms of conflict. The work of nuclear deterrence 
theorists such as Waltz, Brodie, and Glaser will contribute to elucidating the diminishing 																																																								
1 "2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," in UN 
Organization (2015) 
2 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," The American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 
(September 1990), page 732 	
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effect of nuclear weapons on deterrence and the impracticality of nuclear weapons in 
warfare. An analysis of historical events and proceedings will demonstrate the changing 
role of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon states in a globalized world dependent on 
interstate cooperation. 
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I. Introduction 
Using nuclear weapons as a warfare strategy has become largely obsolete since 
the end of the Cold War. While the sheer destructive power of nuclear detonation is 
widely understood, the possession of nuclear weapons still remains a global phenomenon. 
The persisting importance of nuclear weapons lies in the political undertones they have 
developed in the years leading up to the current global security environment. The Non-
Proliferation Treaty has been an indispensible aspect of facilitating this change in nuclear 
perceptions. The NPT is constructed to address and manage non-proliferation, peaceful 
nuclear energy, and disarmament in the context of both nuclear and non-nuclear 
membership. Empirical knowledge on NPT compliance incentives defend, justify, and 
reinforce the existence of a multilateral power dynamic that values nuclear possession.3 
The evolving nature of conflict and interstate relations during and since the end of the 
Cold War helps to elucidate how the power of nuclear states in the NPT has shifted in the 
face of current global security challenges. The question of whether the NPT successfully 
encourages disarmament or whether its perpetuation of the status quo counteracts 
incentives for disarmament is explored in relation to modern dynamics and conceptions 
of political power.  
 
II. The Evolving Purpose of Nuclear Weapons:  
A Historical and Contemporary Comparative Analysis 
The natural progression of and developments in warfare tactics create a constant 
evolution of technological innovation, attitudes toward conflict, and strategies toward 																																																								
3 Daniel Verdier, "Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Non-Proliferation Regime," International 
Organization 62, no. 3 (Summer 2008), page 442 
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deterrence. With the introduction of nuclear weapons, interstate conflict came to revolve 
around defensive rather than offensive strategies to protect and preserve domestic 
security through deterrence. Deterrence theorist Bernard Brodie noted that “the effects of 
nuclear weapons derive not from any particular design for their employment of war but 
simply by their presence.”4 The contemporary significance of nuclear weapons has 
become largely psychological; they have come to symbolize alliances and group security 
in an integrated global community with codified multilateral agreements. As Glaser 
claims, the improving relation between nuclear powers has initiated a change in the role 
of nuclear weapons.5 They provide a political blanket and the promise of security at a 
nearly theoretical level, as the practicality of their deployment in military exploits has 
diminished significantly since the Cold War. Although the potential for war still remains, 
“nuclear weapons have drastically reduced the probability of its being fought by the 
states that have them.”6 In the face of changing global security challenges and 
innovations in warfare strategies, nuclear weapons have developed into a political tool for 
interstate diplomacy and cohesion, largely losing any genuine deterrent potential. 
2.1 Historical: Defense and Deterrence in the Cold War Era 
The U.S., having detonated the first nuclear weapon on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
in 1945, posed a threat of military and political superiority for the Soviet Union. For a 
span of over 40 years, the Eastern and Western superpowers competed for the power of 
deterrence through nuclear development programs as a national security strategy, forming 
																																																								
4 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York, USA: Macmillan, 1973), page 412 
5 C. Glaser, "The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament," Global Politics and Strategy 40, no. 1 (1998), page 117 
6 Waltz, "Nuclear Myths…" page 744 
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an era of political and military tension.7 A critical aspect of the Cold War, the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union multiplied their nuclear weapon arsenals far beyond the requirements of 
deterrence– “each has obsessively measured its strategic forces against the other’s. The 
arms competition between them has arisen from failure to appreciate the implications of 
nuclear weapons for military strategy and, no doubt, from internal military and political 
pressures in both countries.”8 
As a new form of warfare, the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons during the Cold 
War is thought to have prevented physical conflict through defending domestic and allied 
security. The Soviet Union’s potential for attacking Western Europe was hampered by 
the threat of an irreversibly destructive weapon capable of annihilating large proportions 
of Russian society and infrastructure.9 As proposed by Waltz, “several hundred warheads 
could destroy either the United States or the Soviet Union as ongoing societies.”10 Failing 
to recognize the absurdity of nuclear weapons as a military strategy, both the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union multiplied their nuclear stockpile excessively beyond reason on the 
principle of parading their military and economic capabilities. Continuous proliferation 
was driven by internal military and political pressure as a means to announce 
international superiority and rally nationalist fervor.11 
A way to confer prestige, the countries invested heavily in nuclear weapon 
research and development that contributed to the promise of security for NATO and 
																																																								
7 T.V. Paul, "Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons," Foreign Policy, Security and Strategic 
Studies, 2000 
8 Waltz, "Nuclear Myths…" page 741 
9 Glaser, "The Flawed…" page 118 
10 Waltz, "Nuclear Myths…" page 735 
11 Waltz, "Nuclear Myths…" 741 
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Eastern Bloc countries respectively in the face of conflict.12 After the Cold War, a 
majority of Eastern Bloc countries ratified the NPT– almost all between 1992 and 1995.13 
Before the creation of this treaty in 1968, nuclear weapons were seen as imperative for 
the preservation of domestic security. Once the Soviet Union and the U.S. developed 
nuclear weapons in the 1940s, soon after followed Britain in 1940, France in 1945, and 
India in 1967.14 During this time, the possession of these weapons conferred global 
supremacy by asserting formidable military resources to deter outside aggression. 
Nuclear weapons in their debut as a warfare tactic conveyed a deterrent effect and were 
developed on the basis of military predominance.  
2.2 Contemporary: Political and Diplomatic Resource in a Global Context 
Nuclear weapons now largely serve as a security assurance for nuclear states and 
their allies in addition to a source of diplomatic power.15 Widespread declines in 
isolationist domestic policies has prompted an increasing movement toward global 
governance and multilateral cooperation. This trend has precipitated the importance of 
global security consistencies and power dynamics such that nuclear weapons have begun 
to shift further from a military deterrent toward a source of political leverage in bilateral 
and multilateral negotiations. As their deterrent value decreases, they remain to “provide 
an insurance against an unforeseeable deterioration of relations.”16 In a nuclear world, 
peace is maintained by strategic arms agreements with economic and political 
																																																								
12 Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Greenwood Press, 1976) 
13 Verdier, "Multilateralism, Bilateralism…" page 443 
14 John Borrie, interview by the author, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, Switzerland, 
November 17, 2016. 
15 Christopher Way and Karthika Sasikumar, "Why and When Do Countries Sign the NPT?," Columbia International 
Affairs Online. 
16 Glaser, "The Flawed…" page 124 
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significance, not necessarily military assurances– these agreements “can benefit countries 
economically and help to improve their relations.”17  
The NPT qualifies a nuclear weapon state as having detonated a nuclear weapon 
before January 1st 1967. While France and Britain possess small stockpiles of nuclear 
weapons, it is notably the U.S. that uses nuclear power as a political tool. Multiple NATO 
states, including Turkey, Italy, Germany, and Belgium, have requested the presence of 
U.S. nuclear weapons on domestic soil.18 Official NATO doctrine states that nuclear 
weapons, to this day, remain essential in preserving peace.19 Japan also continues to rely 
on the U.S. nuclear deterrent to uphold peace and protect its territory, as noted in the 
Japanese government’s official “Defense Program Outline.”20 Nuclear weapons on 
foreign soil serve as a statement of U.S. alliances to convey comparable security 
capabilities, rather than genuine threats of detonation. 
The existence of nuclear weapons has prompted a system of comprehensive 
international monitoring and control under the NPT and IAEA. The presence of nuclear 
and non-nuclear states in the NPT requires precautionary monitoring and intervention in 
domestic nuclear energy programs. These safeguards seek to prevent nuclear weapon 
production during the course of peaceful civilian nuclear energy creation.21 This system 
has brought nuclear and non-nuclear countries together in a joint effort to pursue nuclear 
energy and protect against proliferation. The monitoring of nuclear energy through a 
multilateral framework reflects the changing context of the nuclear field.  																																																								
17 Waltz, "Nuclear Myths…" 741 
18 Borrie, interview by the author. 
19 "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (n.p.: n.p., 1999) 
20 Scott Sagan et al., "Are the Requirements for Extended Deterrence Changing?," Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, last modified April 6, 2009 
21 Amory Lovins, Energy/War, Breaking the Nuclear Link (Friends of the Earth, 1980) 
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The possession of nuclear weapons, or alliance with nuclear weapon states, opens 
the door to nuclear fuel, equipment and technology, and research intelligence. Signatories 
to the NPT are much more likely to be exempt from export controls on duel-use 
technology by having signaled their peaceful intentions.22 First indicated in the 1970s, 
South Korea began to pursue a nuclear weapons program upon the perception of a 
weakening U.S. commitment to South Korean defense. In 1975, the U.S. blocked South 
Korea from purchasing a reprocessing facility from France that could be used to create 
nuclear weapons by threatening to terminate South Korean fuel and equipment export for 
a U.S. nuclear reactor, rescinding military aid, and maintaining military presence. 
Additionally, the U.S. coerced Canada into suspending its reactor deal with South Korea 
unless the reprocessing plant was terminated.23 Under significant U.S. pressure, South 
Korea abandoned its nuclear weapons program and signed the NPT in April of 1975.24 
This demonstrates how a nuclear weapon state can profit economically and 
diplomatically by imposing their authority to create costs and benefits for other states.  
In the long and complicated history of North Korea as a nuclear state, the U.S. has 
pursued nuclear power as an instrument of control and manipulation over North Korean 
nuclear activities. While North Korea used nuclear weapons as a military threat, the U.S. 
responded not through paralleled nuclear development, but with systematic power 
initiatives.25 In 1994, before North Korea had retracted its NPT membership, the U.S. 
promised improved economic and diplomatic relations and Light Water Reactor 
																																																								
22 Way and Sasikumar, "Why and When…," Columbia International Affairs Online. 
23 Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), page 302 
24 Daniel A. Pinkston, "South Korea's Nuclear Experiments," last modified November 9, 2004, 
http://www.nonproliferation.org 
25 Davenport, "Chronology of U.S.-North," Arms Control Association 
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assistance under the condition that North Korea consent to a three-stage process of 
eliminating a nuclear weapons program.26 In 1996, the U.S. imposed sanctions on North 
Korea to inhibit imports or exports of missile-technology related transfers, exhibiting 
their ability to manipulate the nuclear power of states outside the legitimate NPT regime.   
 
III. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Internal Power Dynamics 
The NPT was developed in the wake of the Cold War to manage the growing 
threat of nuclear weapons as a military strategy. The indiscriminate nature of nuclear 
weapon detonation drove countries to create a multilateral agreement that would protect 
against continuous proliferation and make headway toward disarmament. The treaty 
establishes nuclear and non-nuclear states through article IX that qualifies a nuclear state 
as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon prior to January 1st 
1967.”27 Analysis of the NPT has shown how independent bilateral negotiations and 
agreements can incentivize compliance and membership through legitimacy, domestic 
security, access to peaceful nuclear resources, and economic and diplomatic benefits.28 
3.1 The Three Pillars 
The first pillar of the NPT is non-proliferation. Nuclear weapon states, hereby 
referred to as NWS, are prohibited from transferring nuclear weapons to any other 
member, and may in no way “assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear state to 
manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons.”29 The non-nuclear states, hereby referred to as 
																																																								
26 Kelsey Davenport, "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy," Arms Control Association, 
accessed October 2016 
27 "The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," in United Nations (1968) 
28 Verdier, "Multilateralism, Bilateralism…" page 458 
29 "The NPT…" article I, (1968) 
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NNWS, may not receive weapons or assistance. In addition, the IAEA has the license to 
verify fulfillment of these obligations and approve all transferred equipment and material. 
The second pillar of the NPT is peaceful nuclear energy. Fulfilled through articles 
IV through V, all parties have the right to develop research, production, and use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. These articles promote the exchange of equipment, 
resources, and knowledge between all parties in the effort of development peaceful 
nuclear energy. Additionally, article III stipulates that non-nuclear weapon states are 
obliged to accept the verification of safeguards by the IAEA to prevent diversion of 
nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons.30 
The third pillar, and perhaps the most difficult to achieve, is disarmament. 
Established solely through article VI, the NPT states promise to pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race. It is 
nearly impossible to enforce and quantify “negotiations in good faith,” making the 
progression of disarmament at the liberty of the nuclear weapon states. At the time of its 
creation, the NPT sought to create a weapon-free world. The active pursuit of 
disarmament efforts by the NWS has been disputed in the NPT review conferences that 
occur at five-year intervals, the argument being that nuclear weapon states are not nearly 
doing enough to relinquish their nuclear arsenals.31 
3.2 Nuclear and Non-Nuclear States 
3.2.1 Nuclear Weapon States 
The NWS have been established as the U.S., France, Britain, Russia, and China. 
Notably, these nations also derive power from their place an the P5 on the UN Security 																																																								
30 "The NPT…" articles III, IV, V (1968) 
31 "The NPT…" article VI (1968) 
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Council.32 Serving as world superpowers, the NWS are integrated into the treaty with 
consideration of their superior nuclear capabilities and fragility of their relationship with 
NNWS. The nuclear regime arms the cartel of NWS with discretion over peaceful nuclear 
resources, unanimous approval by all NWS of any amendments, and inherent monopoly 
over nuclear weapons.3334 Though they are encouraged to share their nuclear resources, 
their possession of nuclear knowledge and materials cannot reliably be investigated or 
quantified in the IAEA, leaving the treaty with little ability to enforce this principle. 
Because nuclear weapons have increasingly become a political tool for the NWS, their 
existence upholds the treaty itself. The inexistence of nuclear states in the NPT would 
significantly decrease the compliance cost for many NNWS member, as will be further 
detailed in the next section. 
3.2.2 Non-Nuclear Weapon States 
The NNWS are those which did not detonate a weapon before the specified date. 
Multiple countries have given up their nuclear capabilities in order to become signatories 
of the treaty, including Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and South Africa.35 Through their 
membership, they are entitled to access any peaceful nuclear energy innovations other 
member states have achieved.36 The nuclear weapon states and those who have developed 
strong nuclear energy programs, such as Argentina, South Korea, Canada, Germany and 
Brazil, can provide resources for less capable states.37 Groups of NNWS are part of 
multilateral alliances, such as NATO and the Eastern bloc countries. Others enjoy the 																																																								
32 Pavel Podvig, interview by the author, United Nations Library, Geneva, Switzerland, November 11, 2016. 
33 Verdier, "Multilateralism, Bilateralism…," page 442 
34 "The NPT," article VII.1 (1968) 
35 Giacomo Luciani, interview by the author, The Graduate Institute of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland, November 3, 
2016. 
36 "The NPT…," article V, (1968) 
37 Borrie, interview by the author. 
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security of bilateral agreements, as is the case with Sweden, South Korea, and Egypt.38 
NNWS are forced to give up their right to nuclear weapon development upon NPT 
membership. In analyzing compliance incentives, we will explore how the power 
dynamic within the NPT has transformed the perception of nuclear weapons from a 
military deterrent into a political device.  
3.2.3 Non-Member Nuclear States 
Nuclear weapon states who remain outside the treaty include India, Pakistan, 
North Korea, and debatably Israel. In order for these states to join the NPT, they must do 
so as non-nuclear states, requiring them to extinguish their nuclear arsenals.39 However, 
holding onto these weapons allows them to perceive themselves as contenders in 
international nuclear security. The main purpose of nuclear weapons is not to redraw 
boundaries, but to achieve a different balance of power.40 Their failure to join the NPT 
implies their inability to use their nuclear weapons as a legitimate source of political 
power, as they fail to align themselves in a multilateral agreement that creates a 
comprehensive organization of a global security dynamic– “the NPT is thus a 
codification of a duel-standard sovereignty, a hierarchy where what is accepted for some 
nations is illegitimate for others.”41 The five existing nuclear state members, under the 
control of global governance, enable the transformation of nuclear weapons as a military 
threat to a valuable contribution to modern political security. 
3.3 Compliance Incentives 
																																																								
38 Verdier, "Multilateralism, Bilateralism…," page 443 
39 "The NPT…," article IX, (1968) 
40 Luciani, interview by the author. 
41 Paul, "Power versus Prudence…"  
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In research on multilateralism, bilateralism, and exclusion in the nuclear non-
proliferation regime, compliance and opportunity cost for NPT membership were 
analyzed on the basis of incentives.42 A multilateral treaty can benefit from superpower 
bilateral diplomacy. According to realists such as Mearsheimer, a multilateral agreement 
like the NPT fosters a multilateral beneficial relationship not on the basis of equal 
treatment and universal participation, but through the multilateral-bilateral dichotomy 
that enables stronger countries to incentivize and uphold membership.43 The NPT is 
constructed to facilitate the ability for more powerful states to offer membership and 
compliance incentives for states with an intermediate cost for compliance. This 
compliance cost refers to the expenses a country must pay for becoming a member. In the 
case of the NPT, these include giving up the potential to develop nuclear weapons, 
subjecting domestic nuclear programs to safeguards, and compromising isolationist 
approaches to national security. Way and Sasikumar argue that “states with acute security 
concerns are less likely to join the NPT, states with high energy needs are more likely to 
join it, and states for whom developing nuclear weapons would be a simple and 
inexpensive task are reluctant to join.”44 The incentives that seek to deflect a country’s 
compliance reservations reflect the perception of nuclear weapons as a source of political 
power and security.  
A major incentive for alliance with nuclear weapon states has historically been the 
promise of security in the face of conflict: “the presence of a ‘nuclear umbrella’ may be 
sufficient for many protégés to dampen concerns about security risks, allowing nuclear 																																																								
42 Verdier, "Multilateralism, Bilateralism…," page 444 
43 John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 
1994/1995) 
44 Way and Sasikumar, "Why and When…," Columbia International Affairs Online 
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ambitions to remain dormant.”45 However, we have noted that the practicality of actually 
using weapons as both an offensive or defensive strategy has become virtually obsolete in 
the face of modern warfare. So why do non-nuclear states continue to regard nuclear 
states as a security guarantee? It boils down to the evolving value of nuclear weapons as 
representations of power. The understanding of nuclear states as powerful military forces 
with deterrent capacities predated the NPT and eventually established it as an agreement 
that would protect against the spread of nuclear capacities in this context. Under this 
conception of nuclear weapons, states joined and have complied with the NPT to receive 
the benefits of a multilateral agreement that profits from asymmetric power. The 
deterrent value has enabled nuclear states more movement diplomatically on the 
international scale.46 Because of the combination of modern changes in warfare and the 
stigmatization of nuclear weapons as virtually useless, and thus their deterrent capacity 
also increasingly irrelevant, the original power of nuclear weapons upon which the NPT 
was constructed has become outdated. However, this initial effect precipitated a 
multilateral agreement that led to bilateral economic and diplomatic pursuits, such as fuel 
and equipment trade between the U.S. and South Korea, and an intensified perception of 
the power of alignment with nuclear states, as seen through the placement of U.S. 
warheads in NATO countries. 
Compliance incentives initially revolved around security guarantees, legitimacy, 
and access to exclusive nuclear fuel and technology.47 Non-nuclear weapon states 
debated the worth of renouncing the option of a nuclear arsenal to join an agreement that 																																																								
45 Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo, "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 51, no. 1 (February 2007), page 170 
46 Borrie, interview by the author. 
47 Verdier, "Multilateralism, Bilateralism…," page 442	
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would provide these benefits. While plenty of states joined for these reasons, other states 
joined later on upon bilateral incentives, such as Egypt. The U.S. ability to influence 
Israel enabled American diplomats to reassure Egypt that Israel would not introduce 
weapons into the Middle East.48 By 1991, the U.S. had developed its nuclear power into a 
diplomatic political stronghold when its mediation and financial assistance for Belarus, 
Ukraine, and Kazakhstan resulted in their NPT membership as non-nuclear states.49  
 
IV. Nuclear Power in the Context of Contemporary Conflict 
The way that war is fought changes in the face of technological innovations, 
strategic developments, historical lessons, changing threats, and an evolving global 
security dynamic. In an age when weapons have become so destructive that an interstate 
war between superpowers has become inconceivable, conflict between states has 
drastically changed.50 The introduction of new offensive approaches, such as cyber-
warfare and autonomous weapons, has depleted the military value of deploying nuclear 
warheads. Additionally, the formalization of humanitarian law and acceptance of global 
obligations to civil protection make the detonation of a nuclear weapon impossible as a 
functional strategy. The persistence of nuclear weapons and continuous negotiation over 
their control implies their persisting value in a changing global framework.  
4.1 The Changing Nature of Conflict 
In modern times, democratic states are much less likely to engage in physical 
interstate conflict among the changing qualifications of a powerful state. Instead, these 																																																								
48 Ariel E. Levite, "Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security 27, no. 3 (Winter 
2002/2003), abstract 
49 Drezner, The Sanctions…, page 175 
50 Waltz, "Nuclear Myths…," 732 
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more advanced states engage in economic warfare by manipulating sanctions, trade 
agreements, currency values and exchange rates, and investment.51 The power of a state 
has come to reflect commercial and economic success and hegemony. Overall stability in 
a world with a diminished chance of physical conflict increasingly relies on political, 
economic, and diplomatic prowess. The decreasing threat of interstate war has initiated 
increasing threats by non-state groups using modern tactics that challenge traditional 
defense strategies. The introduction of information warfare, autonomous weapons, and 
terrorist tactics has altered the dynamic of international conflict. The evolving nature of 
offensive strategies by powerful states and the challenge of defending against new threats 
have rendered the deterrent and offensive power of nuclear weapons obsolete.   
4.1.1 Economic Warfare 
 Economic warfare is an increasingly popular strategy by which states gain power 
through depleting the economic resources of opposing forces. States use domestic 
advantages in market control, trade surplus, currency strength, foreign exchange reserves, 
and private corporations as a means to assert diplomatic power. Trade embargoes, 
sanctions, tariff discrimination, freezing of capital assets, suspension of aid, blockage of 
investment and manipulation of capital flows serve as indispensible approaches to 
gaining political and diplomatic hegemony in the modern era. Using these tactics enables 
powerful states to control financial resources and use their economic monopoly as a 
bargaining chip in diplomatic processes. By combining the logic of conflict and methods 
																																																								
51 Gyula Csurgai, "Geopolitics, Geoeconomics and Economic Intelligence," in Canadian Institute of Strategic 
Studies (n.p.: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998), page 3 	
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of commerce, strong states have shaped the modern characteristics of conflict in the face 
of new perceptions of state power.52  
4.1.2 Non-State Actors and the War on Terror 
The rise in terrorism on a global scale, with attacks breaking out from Russia to 
the U.S., is a growing phenomenon that has posed challenges for traditional deterrent 
strategies. Modern terror groups are characterized by dispersed and unspecified alliances, 
constant mobility, and indiscriminate attacks. Transnational, national, and subnational 
organizations and networks monopolize threats to modern security that are inherently 
difficult to defeat. As seen with ISIS, support is garnered largely over the internet and 
attacks can be hard to predict or trace. These movements lack a distinct home location, 
making terrorists hard to track, destroy, and defend against– attacks can originate in 
Kobani and be detonated in London. The indiscriminate and unpredictable nature of 
modern terrorism has precipitated a new and challenging threat to both international and 
domestic security.53  
Because of the decreasing probability of superpower interstate wars, most 
physical threats to security have come to revolve around insurgency groups, terrorist 
groups, and other violent non-state actors.54 A strong military capacity like the U.S. 
requires sizeable funding, intense training, and advanced strategic knowledge. However, 
modern technological warfare tactics require no face-to-face conflict, such as information 
warfare and autonomous weaponry. 
4.2 Evolving Approaches to Offensive Tactics 																																																								
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4.2.1 Information Warfare 
Led by the “rapid evolution of cyberspace, microcomputers, and associated 
information technologies,” information warfare is increasingly becoming a offensive 
tactic to gain competitive advantage over an opponent under the assumption that modern 
security is highly reliant on technology.55 Tactics like shutting down computer networks, 
infiltrating intelligence information, sabotaging stock transactions or leaking classified 
information are used to weaken essential networks modernly used to preserve and uphold 
national security. Today, critical infrastructure protection centers on “civilian and 
commercial systems and services. Military force is less important.”56  
While cyber attacks do not pose a similar level of lethality as did nuclear weapons 
as a form of warfare, modern conflict has come to revolve around threats and destruction 
of security networks rather than physical mobilization.57 Because of the increased 
importance of economic standing as a determinant of power, effective warfare is 
conceived to be that which dismantles economic and security maintenance.58 Thus, 
nuclear weapon’s capacity for destruction not only makes them an unfavorable approach 
to conflict, but conveys little genuine threat of attack, as much more detrimental 
approaches can be taken to truly compromise a state’s security in the modern conception 
of state power.  
4.2.2 Autonomous Weapons 
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Modern warfare tactics center around the idea that “superior political will, when 
properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power.”59 Along with the 
generation of information warfare, tactics like autonomous weapons support the idea that 
a strong military is extraneous for pursuing isolated and indiscriminate destruction. These 
weapons include drones, unmanned ground or maritime vehicles, software robots for 
cyber-attacks, and automated sentry guns.60 The ability to create targeting lists using 
military doctrine and targeting processes is inherently strategic, and handing this 
capability over to a machine undermines existing command and control structures and 
renders the use for humans redundant.61 Because these weapons can be deployed and 
controlled from isolated locations, it’s difficult to track the whereabouts of their 
deployment. Unlike nuclear weapons, which are bragged about by most possessors to 
convey a deterrent effect, autonomous weapons gain their power from their 
unpredictability and their lack of human control over targeting and attack functions.62 
4.3 Nuclear Weapons in Defense and Deterrence 
4.3.1 Formalization of International Norms 
The NPT has encouraged acceptance of international norms and has thus curbed 
motivations for the use of nuclear weapons.63 If humanitarian law had been as established 
and widely respected as it is today, the nuclear attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 
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would have been in violation on multiple accounts.64 Humanitarian law regulates the 
conduct of war in order to protect civilians and manage the destructive capabilities of 
attacks.65 Certain conventional weapons such as biological and chemical weapons were 
not comprehensively banned in the use of war until 1980.66 Despite the lack of a reliable 
enforcement mechanism, violations of humanitarian law can be responded to with 
powerful public and media shaming, retraction of outside funding and support, and 
national and international tribunals.67 Compliance with and respect towards international 
law can be signaled through the NPT– countries can “use accession to signal their 
peaceful intentions and try to garner international support with their renunciatory act.”68 
Humanitarian law has struggled to address the ethicality of using cyber-warfare and 
autonomous weapons.69  
4.3.2 Obsolete Use in a Contemporary Context 
Because of the changing dynamic of interstate conflict, new developments in 
warfare undermine or supersede the concept of nuclear deterrence.70 Nuclear weapons 
have long had power as a defensive threat to deter potentially attacking countries. Now 
that the genuine ability to use them has become superseded by the establishment of 
international norms, humanitarian law, and the challenge of attacking indistinguishable 
aggressors, their deterrent capability holds a symbolic rather than realistic effect. In a 
nuclear world increasingly threatened by terrorism, it’s clear that nuclear weapons have 																																																								
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not deterred the persisting threat of non-state aggression.71 The ability of nuclear 
weapons to convey power because of their historic representation justifies their continued 
importance as a source of political power.  
 
V. Nuclear Validation: Hegemony and Monopoly 
The NPT validates the existence of asymmetric power within the non-
proliferation regime. This treaty has been created and maintained through the existence of 
power dynamics between nuclear and non-nuclear states by enabling powerful states to 
incentivize membership and compliance by promising security and peaceful nuclear 
energy resources. Inherently, it attempts to promote disarmament and create more 
equitable access to peaceful nuclear energy research and resources. But because the treaty 
is sustained by a power dynamic that is trying to be dismantled, disarmament of the NWS 
would result in changes in the current global power distribution and challenge the very 
existence of the NPT.72 The debate of whether the NPT seeks to really achieve 
disarmament of the NWS or whether it benefits from nuclear weapon states by upholding 
the status quo calls into question the future of the NPT. The newfound power of nuclear 
weapons as a political resource dismantles the genuine threat of usage, but promises 
diplomatic leverage, given that “proliferators are subject to diplomatic pressure and 
international sanctions, as well as legal and moral condemnation.”73  
5.1 Establishment of Economic and Diplomatic Superpowers  
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The promise of an organized treaty facilitating the share of nuclear knowledge 
and controlling the actions of nuclear states incentivizes countries to trust existing nuclear 
states as reliable diplomatic resources.74 The existence of few powerful states in a 
multilateral agreement with an overwhelming majority of weaker, less capable states 
allows these weaker states to wrestle for concessions with the great powers who “have an 
interest in controlling proliferation” in exchange for giving up their freedom to 
maneuver.75 In addition, leaving the treaty creates exit costs if they are in violation. 
While the NPT itself has no enforcement provisions, all members sign an agreement with 
the IAEA.76 Apart from formal provisions, violating or exiting the treaty can have 
consequences for a state’s international reputation. Doing so isolates a state from the 
benefits of a comprehensive multilateral alliance where the most powerful states are at 
the liberty to share nuclear knowledge and equipment, provide security for other states, 
and legitimize another state’s actions.  
Perhaps the most notable case of the power of nuclear hegemony can be seen with 
Iran. Signing the treaty in 1968, Iran subjected itself to standard monitoring and 
safeguards of nuclear facilities and programs by the IAEA. Iran’s actions became closely 
tracked and IAEA reports shaped the U.S. diplomatic approach to Iranian relations. In 
1998, the Clinton Administration opposed Iranian nuclear programs under the argument 
that they had sufficient oil for energy supply, and that a nuclear power reactor would 
facilitate a nuclear weapons program. Additionally, U.S. political power induced 
Ukraine’s denial to sell equipment for use at an Iranian reactor under investigation. In 
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2000, President Clinton signed the Iran Non-Proliferation Treaty, enabling the U.S. to 
impose sanctions on individuals or organizations providing resources to Iran’s nuclear 
program. This reflects the ability of the U.S. to use its standing in the international 
community and in the NPT to compromise the security of one state by manipulating the 
actions of others. In 2003, additional protocol expanding the Safeguards Agreement was 
signed by Iran to enable short notice inspections.77 That same year, Iranian President 
Khatami attested to the political motives behind pursuing nuclear power: "We don't need 
atomic bombs, and based on our religious teaching, we will not pursue them...but at the 
same time, we want to be strong, and being strong means having knowledge and 
technology."78 The connotation of nuclear capability associated with political power and 
diplomatic prerogative drives countries to this day to value nuclear weapons.  
5.2 The Current Global Security Dynamic  
One major factor of the NPT is the establishment of the five nuclear weapon 
states and the existence of four nuclear non-members. Pursuant to article IX section 3, 
nuclear states willing to join the NPT must have detonated a weapon before the 1st of 
January 1967, or must disarm to become a NNWS. This article fortifies the power held 
by the NWS by making it exclusive and non-competitive. Glaser suggests that, unless 
there is a complete transformation of international relations, the promise for disarmament 
to protect against nuclear war is weak.79 The NWS “try to do enough on disarmament to 
show they care, but have taken a tough line on countries like Iran that look like they 
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might break out of the NPT” in order to preserve the current order.80 Although the NPT 
seeks to encourage states to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race,” the power dynamic upheld through the 
treaty normalizes and perpetuates the status quo, deterring any real incentives for 
disarmament.  
 5.2.1 NPT’s Exclusive Membership 
The four nuclear non-member states include India, Pakistan, North Korea, and, 
more likely than not, Israel. In accordance with Verdier’s theory of compliance cost, 
states with little incentives to disarm would find membership and compliance more 
detrimental than beneficial to their national interests.81 In his research, he found that 
participation in an enduring rivalry indicates a significant security threat, which makes a 
state less likely to want to join the NPT.82 For example, it can be argued that India, a state 
that developed nuclear weapons in 1967, maintains a nuclear arsenal largely out of 
continued tension with Pakistan, who has since developed nuclear weapons as well.83 
Threatened by powerful rivals, North Korea may use nuclear weapon capabilities to level 
the playing field with their global competitors.84 Israel, a strong U.S. ally in a region of 
U.S.-Middle Eastern tension, avoids the risk of IAEA violations by remaining a non-NPT 
signatory state. It has been proposed that Israel prefers to have nuclear weapons, or 
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maintain nuclear ambiguity, as to convey regional strength in the face of instability in the 
Middle East and the threat of Iran.85 
Prohibiting membership of new nuclear states into the NPT is largely a double 
standard, but admits that integrating other nuclear states into the NPT could threaten the 
current global security dynamic upheld by the five legitimized nuclear states. Many states 
comply with the treaty and have relinquished the possibility of developing their own 
nuclear weapons program for the security and diplomatic benefits of aligning themselves 
in a multilateral agreement with powerful states.86 By this logic, in the event that a 
current nuclear non-member state relinquished its nuclear arsenal, that state would further 
jeopardize its current unstable security that inherently inhibits it from valuing the benefits 
of the treaty. The existence of nuclear non-member states and their prohibition from 
joining the NPT in their current state reflects the political balance that nuclear weapons 
uphold. The supremacy of Russia, the U.S., France, Britain, and China in upholding 
global economic processes and multilateral diplomatic agreements would be threatened if 
the nuclear power of more states were to be validated through the NPT.  
5.2.2 Safeguards on Nuclear Energy Development 
Besides the aspect of non-member states, the NPT maintains the current global 
security dynamic by preventing proliferation of NNWS through strict IAEA safeguards, 
while inherently acknowledging the existence of nuclear programs in the NWS.87 The 
threat of Iran has been combated so harshly because of the potential for nuclear weapons 
to upset the regional balance of power in the Middle East. The desire for nuclear weapons 
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as political tool can be seen through Iran, a state that is “surrounded by nuclear powers- 
Russia to the north, Pakistan to the east, Israel to the west, and the US 5th fleet in the gulf 
itself.”88 The IAEA has the ability to safeguard against developing peaceful nuclear 
energy into enrichment or reprocessing programs capable of producing nuclear weapons. 
If Iran were to develop nuclear weapons, they could provoke Israel, a non-member state 
not under the safeguards of the IAEA, or could provoke other Middle Eastern countries to 
pursue nuclear weapons as a defense reaction.89 The ability for existing nuclear states to 
monopolize power in our current state of global security is upheld and reproduced by the 
NPT. If the NWS were to disarm, the presence of external nuclear states not under the 
same obligations would pose a threat to international security.90 Thus, in an effort to 
uphold global security, nuclear weapons are maintained.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
The history and progression of nuclear weapons has demonstrated the unique 
evolution of this conflict strategy from warfare defense, to deterrent, to security promise. 
The combination of these factors that have developed among an era of globalization has 
cemented nuclear weapons as a source of a diplomatic and economic stronghold. As 
countries progressively developed stronger and more numerous nuclear arsenals, the 
practicality of using them greatly diminished. Their presence and qualifying factor in the 
NPT reinforces them as a way for powerful states to project power and influence 
diplomacy. The NPT bolsters the effect that nuclear weapons have. The power dynamic 																																																								
88 Luciani, interview by the author. 
89 Gawdat Bahgat, "Nuclear Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran," Iranian Studies 39, no. 3 (August 3, 2006), 
page 316 
90 Glaser, "The Flawed…," page 124  	
	 Gleeson 30 
between NWS and NNWS has initiated reliance on the existence of these weapons to 
uphold compliance of states in the hopes that doing so will result in a projection of 
alliance power.  
Also precipitated from the changes in global conflict, nuclear weapons have 
shifted from weapon to political resource. Perhaps partially in light of nuclear weapons, 
interstate conflict centers on economic warfare, as economic resources have come to 
define the strength and hegemony of a state on the global stage. The growing threat of 
information warfare and autonomous weapons renders nuclear weapons incompatible in 
deterring or defending against modern forms of conflict. Because of this, the deterrent 
effect of nuclear weapons so valued in prior decades as begun to diminish. The existence 
of these weapons is validated by the NPT as it has precipitated nuclear weapon states to 
monopolize control over economic and diplomatic multilateral and bilateral negotiations. 
The construction of the NPT itself, prohibiting the addition of more nuclear weapon 
states, reinforces the current power distribution by limiting nuclear power to the five 
NWS and thus enabling them to monopolize nuclear weapon capabilities that has come to 
denote legitimate political power.91 It is on this principle that the NPT will likely face 
trouble to successfully encourage the disarmament of these nuclear weapon states.  
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